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1. Introduction 
In 1986 László Nagy started to organize an annual seminar on comparative 
labour law and social security law. It went on for 13 years. Until the downfall 
of the iron curtain it was one of the few occasions where scholars and students 
from East and West could meet to exchange ideas. I am still grateful for the 
privilege to have had the opportunity to participate in all of these exciting and 
enlightening seminars and thereby to closely collaborate with László. 
In the meantime history has changed. Hungary has left his communist past 
behind and — together with seven other Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEE) as well as Malta and Cyprus — will join the European Union (EU) in 
2004. The enlargement of 2004 is without any doubt the biggest challenge the 
EU has ever faced, not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of quality. 
The surface area of the EU will be increased by one third and the population 
will grow from about 390 000 to about 450 000. At the same time the GDP only 
will increase by 5 per cent which means that within the EU the GDP per head 
will decline by about 18 per cent.' The number of languages spoken in the EU 
will almost double and the problem of finding a fair balance between smaller 
and bigger countries will be more urgent than ever. 
In the context of this enlargement situation the CEE States are of specific 
interest. They still have to complete the process of switching from a State-
controlled economy to a market-based economy and thereby have to develop 
systems of industrial relations that not only function efficiently but are adapted 
to the particular socio-cultural environment of the country concerned. There are 
significant differences between the various CEE States, and it would be a 
' See M. LADÓ: EU Enlargement: Reshaping European and National Industrial Relations. The 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (IJCLLIR), vol. 18, 
2002, 101. 
502 — MANFRED WEISS 
mistake to lump all of them together in this respect.' Nevertheless it is possible 
— to varying extents — to identify characteristics that they all have in common. 
The focus of my reflection, therefore, will be on the question of how the 
industrial relations scenery in the CEE countries (neglecting Malta and Cyprus) 
will affect the Europeanization of industrial relations and what impact the latter 
will have on the transformation process in the CEE States. 
After sketching very briefly the basic features of the development of 
industrial relations in the CEE States an attempt will be made to describe the 
features of the Europeanization of industrial relations. Then the question is to 
be discussed whether and how the two can be linked together in the integration 
process.' 
2. Industrial Relations in the CEE States 
The CEE States were confronted with the dilemma of transforming 
simultaneously an authoritarian regime into a democracy, a planned economy 
into a market economy and a party-dictated system of industrial relations into 
one which is compatible with political freedoms and market economy. The 
present structure of industrial relations in the CEE States to a great extent still 
is to be explained as a reaction to and a legacy of the communist system of the 
past. It is — as will be shown — the expression of a highly individualistic neo-
liberal approach.° 
2.1. Trade Unions 
In the period before the political change in the CEE States the rule was a 
monistic system of trade unions which were more or less mere instruments of 
the ruling party. There was an important exception: the movement of 
Solidarnosz in Poland was created as an autonomous alternative to the existing 
trade union structure. The monistic pattern of the communist period in the 
meantime has been replaced by an excessive pluralism. Quite often it looks as if 
trade unions are more concerned to compete with each other than understanding 
2 For these very significant differences see the enlightening report by M. LADÓ on "Industrial 
relations in the candidate countries". European industrial relations observatory on-line, 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2002/07/feature/TN0207102F.htm  
' For a brief discussion of this challenge see also M. WEISS, The social dimension, in R. 
LANGEWIESCHE / A. TOTH: The Unity of Europe, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels, 2001, 
123, and M. WEISS: Industrial Relations and Elf-Enlargement, in R. BLANPAIN / M. WEISS (eds.), 
Changing Industrial Relations and Modernisation of Labour Law, Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague / London / New York, 2003, 439. 
° M. STANOJEVIC / G. GRADES: Workers' representation at company level in CEE countries, 
TRANSFER, vol. 9, 2003, 31 (44). 
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their role as being the counterpart to the employers' side, thereby weakening the 
strength of the labour movement as a whole.' But the situation is even much 
worse. The creation of a private sector in the economy has gone hand in hand 
with an extensive erosion of the system of trade union representation. The 
backbone of the private sector in these countries are the small and medium-
sized companies (SMEs). And there trade unions practically do not exist and 
do not play any role.° Since in these SMEs are no other bodies representing 
employees' interests the result in most cases is total individualization of the 
relationship between employers and employees. Trade unions only play a role 
in the bigger — still or formerly State owned — enterprises. On the whole the 
organisation rate of trade unions has declined significantly.' 
2.1. Employers' Associations 
The situation of employers' associations is even worse. They only exist to a 
very rudimentary extent and mainly represent the interests of the big 
enterprises, many of them are still not yet privatized. In principle the employers 
in the SMEs do not see yet the need to organize. If employers' associations are 
founded this is done not in a perspective of acting as a counterpart to trade 
unions but with the intention of lobbying for common business interests.' 
Therefore, on the whole employers' associations may be considered to be a 
rather marginal player up to now.' 
2.2. Tripartite Arrangements 
A characteristic feature of most of the CEE States are tripartite arrangements on 
national level. These are bodies to discuss issues of restructuring the economy 
and how to promote social justice. There is no doubt: this tripartite social 
dialogue has its merits and has played an important role in the process of 
restructuring industrial relations in the CEE States. However, the problem 
consists in the fact that this social dialogue is asymmetrical. The State still 
dominates weak trade unions and even weaker employers' associations. These 
discussion forums are largely serving to legitimize the respective Government's 
policy. 10 In spite of the structural deficiency many decisions are taken in the 
' H. KOHL / H.-W. PLATZER: Labour Relations in central and eastern Europe and the European 
social model, TRANSFER, vol. 9, 2003, 11 (15). 
6  For details see M. LADE / D. VAUGHAN-WHITEHEAD: Social Dialogue in candidate countries: 
what for?, TRANSFER, vol. 9., 2003, 64 (69). 
' M. ',ADC) / D. VAUGHAN-WHITEHEAD: (FN 6) 66. 
8 See M. LADÓ: (FN 2) under the subtitle "Diversity in industrial relations — heritage of the 
past". 
9 See M. LADE / D. VAUGHAN-WHITEHEAD: (FN 6) 70. 
10 M. LADó: (FN 1) 111. 
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tripartite social dialogue, thereby preventing to a certain extent the evolution of 
autonomous bilateral collective bargaining structures. However, there is at 
present no alternative to the tripartite social dialogue as it exists: it is absolutely 
necessary to create acceptance for all the transformation work that has to be 
carried out. It has to be stressed that these arrangements on national level do 
not have a supporting structure on lower levels. 
2.4. Collective Bargaining 
In view of the weakness of the employers' associations and at the non-existence 
of collective actors in big parts of the economy it is no surprise that collective 
bargaining is rather the exception than the rule and that — at least in principle — 
it only takes place on company or plant level. Multi-employer bargaining 
mainly happens in the companies which formerly were parts of a State owned 
big enterprise and now are fragmented in different parts." However, there is 
practically no bargaining on higher levels: be it the sectoral or the national 
one. 12 The coverage by collective agreements is very low. They only play a role 
in bigger companies, the big amount of companies in the private sector is not at 
all affected by them. 
2.5. Employees' Involvement in Management's Decision-Making 
Due to the experience made before the fall of the Iron Curtain there is still 
much reluctance to accept workers' participation as a feasible pattern in the new 
market economy." Nevertheless there is quite a lot of legislation providing for 
institutionalized workers' participation, 14 in most cases without the support of 
the social partners. In particular there is scepticism and opposition in the trade 
union camps. There are mainly three problems. First this pattern only plays a 
role in big companies. 15 Secondly the institutional arrangements in some cases 
are too much of a copy of systems of Western Europe and therefore do not 
really fit into the overall structure of the respective country. Finally there is no 
appropriate division of labour between trade unions and such bodies of workers' 
participation. This lack of a consistent and coherent concept of the system of 
industrial relations as a whole creates rivalry and suspicion and in the very end 
" See M. LADE: (FN 2) under the subtitle "Sectoral collective bargaining — current state of 
affairs". 
12 M. LADE / D. VAUGHAN-WHITEHEAD: (FN 6) 73. 
13 See M. SEwERYNSKI: Employee Involvement and EU Enlargement — Polish Perspective, in 
M. Biagi (ed.), Quality of Work and Employee Involvement in Europe, Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague / London / New York, 2002, 263 (270). 
14  For an overview see H. KOHL / H.-W. PLATZEtt: (FN 5) 15 and M. LADE: (FN 2) under the 
subtitle "Information and Consultation of workers". 
15 M. STANOJEVIC / G. GRADEV: (FN 4) 45. 
EU-Enlargement and Industrial Relations — 505  
weakens and de-legitimises the position of elected workers' representatives as 
well as of the trade unions. It, however, again has to be stressed that in the big 
majority of companies in the private sector neither trade unions nor other 
bodies of workers' representatives exist. Where they are formally present, they 
in actual practice quite often are under management control, mere "extensions 
of managerial structures". 16 
2.6. Law in the Books and Law in Action 
The production of legislation after the political change in all CEE States has 
been quite impressive and is still continuing to an enormous extent." This ties 
in with the legalistic approach that is still commonly found in the CEE States, 
whereby a problem is regarded as having been solved if a law or regulation has 
been passed to deal with it. The gap between the normative level and day-to-
day practice remains considerable. 1 e There are many reasons for the fact that the 
implementation side is so unsatisfactory ranging from resentment of 
intervention on the basis of labour legislation to a lack of controls and 
inefficiency of the existing judicial system or other conflict resolving bodies. In 
view of their weakness neither trade unions nor other bodies of workers' 
representation are in a position to really monitor the factual implementation of 
statutory law. 
In addition it has to be stressed that within the large number of companies 
in the private sector of the CEE countries in actual practice labour law plays no 
role whatsoever. It is made too easy for companies to sign contracts on the 
basis of general civil law and thus to avoid the statutory labour and social 
provisions aimed at providing employees with a degree of protection. 19 This 
leads, of course, to a constant process of de-legitimization of labour and social 
security legislation. And as a result to an increasing extent a mentality can be 
observed which praises the free game of market forces in the absence of labour 
law and social security law as well as the absence of collective structures as an 
ideal precondition for prosperity. 
16 Ibidem. 
17 See the discussion paper by A. BRONSTEIN: Labour Law Reform in EU Candidate 
Countries: achievements and challenges, on-line. 
http.//www. ilo.org/public/English/dialogue/ifpdial/download/papers/candidate.pdf  
18 See M. LAD()/ D. VAUGHAN-WHITEHEAD: (FN 6) 80. 
19 C. KOLLONAY-LEHOCZKY: European Enlargement — A Comparative View of Hungarian 
Labour Law (forthcoming). 
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3. The Europeanization of Industrial Relations 
3.1. Fundamental Social Rights 
After a long-lasting and very controversial debate in 2000 the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU was passed as a legally-non binding declaration, 
expressing the consensus of all present Member States. In the meantime a 
specific body (the so called convention) presented a draft for a Constitutional 
Treaty, replacing and amending the old Treaties on the EU and on the EC. This 
draft presently is discussed by the Governmental Conference. The final 
document most probably will be signed by the Member States either in the end 
of 2003 or in the beginning of 2004. There is no doubt that the Charter in the 
version as it presently stands will be integrated in the Constitutional Treaty and 
thereby become legally binding. 
Within the Charter there is a specific chapter for fundamental social rights 
under the title "solidarity". But even outside this chapter there is a whole set of 
such rights of utmost importance in the social context, including the freedom of 
association, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade 
unions for the protection of his or her interests (Art. 12). The chapter on 
"solidarity" as such contains twelve core rights, including the workers' right "to 
working conditions which respect his or her health and dignity" (Art. 31 par. 1), 
the right of collective bargaining and collective action which is guaranteed as a 
subjective right either for workers and employers or for their respective 
organizations (Art. 28), and the right for either workers or their representatives 
on information and consultation in good time in reference to management's 
decision making (Art. 27). The two latter fundamental rights of course are of 
utmost importance in the context discussed in this paper. 
In evaluating the content of the chapter on "solidarity" it has to be stressed 
that it includes collective rights, it insists on the Community's and the Member 
States responsibility for providing job security, for providing working 
conditions which respect the worker's health, safety and dignity and for 
protecting young people at work. It furthermore insists on measures to make 
family and professional life compatible and to provide social security as well as 
social assistance. Taken all this together it becomes pretty evident that this is a 
concept which would be incompatible with mere de-regulation, de-
collectivization and de-institutionalization. Or to put it in broader terms: it 
would be incompatible with a strict neo-liberal approach. 20 
20 For a detailed analysis of the impact of the fundamental social rights in the Charter see M. 
WEISS: The politics of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. in B. Hepple (ed.), Social and 
Labour Rights in a Global Context, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 73 
EU-Enlargement and Industrial Relations — 507 
3.2. Minimum Standards 
Up to now the Community's legislative activity has not been characterized by a 
systematic approach. This is mainly due to the fact that social policy only 
gradually became a relevant factor in the context of the Community. Now there 
is a far-reaching power to legislate in the field of labour law and social security. 
However, the EC still has no power to legislate in reference to "pay, the right of 
association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs". And there is no 
hope that this will be changed by the Constitutional Treaty. 
In the meantime many topics are covered by Directives, thereby influencing 
the law of the Member States. However, my focus is not on these topics. It 
rather has to be stressed that to an increasing extent the Directives are shaped in 
a way which gives the social partners and workers' representatives a significant 
role in implementing them. A very good example in this respect is the Directive 
on Working Time.' 
3.3. Social Dialogue 
The umbrella organisations of the trade unions and of the employers' 
associations on EU level are not involved in collective bargaining but are 
primarily considered to be a lobby for the respective interests groups they 
represent. They for a long time were informally cooperating with the 
Commission. This so called "social dialogue" for the first time was formalized 
by the Treaty in 1986. In the meantime it has achieved a very elaborated 
structure by Art. 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty. 
Nowadays the above mentioned actors are integrated into the legislative 
machinery. Before submitting a proposal of legislation the Commission has to 
consult them "on the possible direction of Community action". If the 
Commission then still wants to continue to elaborate a proposal there has to be 
a second consultation of the parties of the social dialogue "on the content of 
this proposal". On this occasion the social partners can take over each 
Commission's initiative and try to regulate the matter by reaching an agreement. 
They have nine months to elaborate an agreement which then — without the 
involvement of the European Parliament — can be transformed into a legally 
binding Directive by the Council. The Directives on parental leave, on fixed-
term contracts and on part-time work are results of such a procedure. If the 
social partners cannot reach an agreement within the period of nine months, the 
task to draft a proposal falls back to the Commission. 
The social partners, however, according to the Treaty do have an alternative 
possibility. They are free to conclude agreements — even in matters where the 
21 See in this context C. BARNARD: The Eu Agenda for Regulating Labour Markets - Working 
Time Revisited (forthcoming) 
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EC has no legislative power — to be implemented "in accordance with the 
procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member 
States". Such agreements are not legally binding. It is up to the social partners 
on EU level to convince the respective actors in the Member States to transform 
the ideas contained in such agreements into their respective structure within the 
Member States. A recent example for such a strategy is the agreement on tele-
work of 2002 whose possible impact now is vividly discussed in the different 
Member States. 
In addition to the inter-professional social dialogue there is an increasing 
number of sectoral social dialogues. 22  They are not integrated into the 
legislative machinery. However, their institutional structure recently has been 
improved in a significant way. Their task is the representation of the specific 
interests of their sector within the EU and the conclusion of agreements which 
now may be binding among them but which remain to be voluntary for the 
actors on lower levels. Such agreements so far only play a marginal role. 23 
3.4. Collective Bargaining 
Up to now and certainly for a long time in the future collective bargaining 
remains to be a matter of policy within the Member States. The legal pattern of 
collective bargaining and collective agreements is different from country to 
country. There is, however, at least one feature common to the collective 
bargaining structure of all current Member States (with the exception of the 
UK): they all have an interrelated multi-level system.24 But again the rules on 
the relationship between agreements on different levels, or between old and 
new agreements, are different from country to country. 
In view of this diversity it would be totally unrealistic to think in terms of a 
European Collective Agreement as an instrument to promote uniformity. 
Nevertheless the need for more cooperation and coordination in collective 
bargaining throughout the Community definitely has increased due to the 
introduction of the European Monetary Union. The new currency leads to an 
increase of transparency: Prices, wages and other working conditions easily can 
be compared. The discrepancies of working conditions between different 
Member States are becoming more evident. This to a bigger and bigger extent 
might lead to pressures to develop strategies directed to the goal of gradual 
convergence — at least in a long term perspective. 
22  For a detailed analysis see B. KELLER: Social Dialogue at Sectoral Level: The Neglected 
Ingredient of European Industrial Relations, in B. Keller / H.-W. Platzer (eds.), Industrial 
Relations and European Integration, Ashgate , Aldershot / Burlington, 2003, 30. 
23  Ibidem 37. 
24  See F. TRAXLER: European Monetary Union and Collective Bargaining, in B. Keller / H.-
W. Platzer (eds.), Industrial Relations and European Integration, Ashgate, Aldershot / 
Burlington, 2003, 85 (90). 
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The monetary union has a second impact on collective bargaining which 
perhaps is even more important. So far it somehow was possible to cope with 
labour market problems by national monetary policy. There was a sort of 
interaction between the actors of collective bargaining and the National 
Reserve Banks. Now monetary policy is centralized and conducted by the 
European Central Bank. The question therefore has to be put whether a 
collective bargaining structure can be established which would correspond to 
the European monetary policy as it did before to the national monetary policy. 25  
The task consists in improving horizontal transnational coordination. In this 
respect at least some progress has been achieved in the last fifteen years. The 
first important step was the so called Doom-declaration of 1988, named after 
the Dutch town Doom where the declaration was signed. In this declaration the 
trade unions of Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany agreed on 
three core principles to be observed in collective bargaining throughout the 
European Community: (a) Wage settlements in collective agreements should 
correspond to the sum total of the evaluation of prices and the increase in 
labour productivity. (b) Collective agreements should make an attempt to 
strengthen mass purchasing power and focus on employment creating measures 
(shorter working time etc.) and (c) There should be regular information and 
consultation between the participating trade unions on developments in 
bargaining policy. In short: the idea was to influence the content of collective 
bargaining by the first two principles and to strengthen the horizontal 
communication by the third principle. The principles on content in the 
meantime have been redefined and shifted from wage issues to non-wage issues 
as for example life long learning. And the attempt of more intensive 
communication has been extended to continuous evaluation. 
In the meantime quite a few initiatives were started on sectoral level. In 
1997 the German metalworkers' trade union launched a cross-border collective 
bargaining network. The idea was that each individual district of this trade 
union was supposed to develop a solid network of collective bargaining 
cooperation with the metalworkers' trade unions of neighbouring countries. In 
addition a common day to day information system on collective bargaining has 
been established. And finally common working groups on specific bargaining 
issues have come into existence. The example of the German metalworkers' 
trade union in the meantime has been followed in Scandinavia by the Nordic 
metalworkers' trade unions and by trade unions from other sectors as for 
-example the construction and the chemical industries. 
The most promising and most far-reaching initiative was taken by the 
European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) in the late nineties of last century. It 
covers the EMF member countries as a whole. The EMF developed guidelines 
25 For the interrelationship of monetary policy and collective bargaining see F. TRAXLER: (FN 
24). 
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for national collective bargaining in order to prevent downward competition. In 
addition it developed Charters on specific issues: on wage bargaining, on 
working time bargaining and on bargaining for training conditions. Other issues 
are to be added. To just illustrate the approach for the case of wage bargaining 
it reads "the point of reference to wage policy in all countries must be to offset 
the rate of inflation and to ensure that workers' incomes retain a balanced 
participation in productivity gains". This of course is nothing more than a 
recommendation: the responsibility remains to be with the individual 
negotiating trade union. The EMF initiative has been accompanied by a 
remarkable process of institution-building. There is now a EMF Collective 
Bargaining Committee for assessing and further developing the structure of this 
initiative. And there are Working Parties for the specific issues. All this has led 
to continuous evaluation, to an intensified continuous communication and to a 
strengthening of personal links between representatives of EMF affiliates. 
Since 1999 the EMF has established a European Collective Bargaining 
Information Network (EUCOB), an excellent data base on recent developments 
in collective bargaining in the metal industries. In the meantime the EMF has 
been followed-up by other European trade union federations as are chemistry, 
construction, food, public service and textile. 
In view of all these initiatives the ETUC in 1999 has passed a resolution on 
a "European system of industrial relations", urging in particular for a 
"European solidaristic pay policy" which should be able to (a) guarantee 
workers a fair share of income, (b) counter the danger of social dumping, (c) 
counter the growing income inequality, (d) contribute to a reduction of 
disparities in living conditions and (e) contribute to an effective implementation 
of the principle of equal treatment of the sexes. In addition the resolution is 
stressing the European Federations' responsibility to coordinate collective 
bargaining. 
In 2000 the ETUC passed a "European guideline for wage increases" which 
very much is shaped according to the model of the already mentioned EMF 
guideline on wage bargaining. The European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), the 
research institute of the ETUC, now is annually evaluating the wage bargaining 
policy in the light of the guideline. 
The listing up of all these initiatives is merely meant to illustrate that the 
need for transnational cooperation and coordination has been understood by the 
trade unions. Even if the structures are still in a rudimentary stage, they are an 
important element to develop a transnational perspective and thereby shape 
collective bargaining in the national context. Of course there is an evident 
deficiency: this development takes place exclusively on the trade union side. 2ó 
26  For a comprehensive overview on all these coordination activities see T. SCHULTEN: 
Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining: Trade Union Initiatives for the Transnational 
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There are no similar attempts on the employers' side. However, the more the 
strategy of coordination and cooperation will be a successful tool in the hands 
of the trade unions, the less it will be possible for the employers' associations 
to simply ignore this new reality. 
The process of transnational coordination and cooperation could be 
significantly stimulated by the social dialogue, the inter-professional one as 
well as the sectoral one. The inter-professional social dialogue should not put 
all its energy in the preparatory steps of legislation but should focus more on 
agreements to be implemented according to national law and practice. Thereby 
it could help to find out what topics might be of primary interest for regulation 
in a more coordinated way. Model agreements could present frameworks to 
enrich the imagination of the national actors. 27 In case the actors on European 
level cannot reach an agreement each side at least could communicate to its 
constituency its respective view. Of course all such framework-agreements and 
communications would not be legally binding. But they could help to stimulate 
discussions on' the domestic bargaining scene of how to cope with such 
proposals. It goes without saying that such a communication strategy only can 
function if there is a vertical dialogue between the European umbrella 
organizations and the different national constituencies. 
It may be stressed that the recent developments in promoting the 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining in the EU context definitely 
are very promising. However, all available instruments are to be used to 
intensify and to accelerate this process. The task is to build up a multi-level 
system with specific articulation on each level, with possibilities for feedback 
from one level to the other, with possibilities for mutual learning in the process 
of coordination. Such a system is supposed to leave the actors on lower levels 
utmost bargaining autonomy but at the same time it puts pressure on them to 
cope with the frameworks established on higher levels. This "open method of 
coordination" in the meantime has become the catchword for the flexible 
strategy in balancing the needs for centralization and decentralization in a 
multi-level system of collective bargaining. 2 B 
Coordination of Collective Bargaining, in B. Keller / H.-W. Platzer (eds.), Industrial Relations 
and European Integration, Ashgate, Aldershot / Burlington, 2003, 58. 
27 See for such a strategy M. WEISS: Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining in the 
Framework of Social Europe, in G. Spyropoulos / G. Fragniére (eds.), Work and Social Policies 
in the New Europe, European Interuniversity Press. Brussels, 1991, 59. 
28  For a comprehensive analysis of this strategy see European Commission, Report of the 
High level group on industrial relations and change in the European Union, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 2002; see also C. DE LA PORTE / P. 
POCHET: Supple Co-ordination at EU Level and the Key Actors' Involvement, in C. de la Porte / 
P. Pochet (eds.), Building Social Europe through the Open Method of Coordination, Inter 
University Press, Brussels, 2002, 27. 
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3.5. Employment Policy 
The "open method of coordination" not only refers to coordinated collective 
bargaining but to practically all policy areas in which the social partners are 
supposed to be integrated. A good example is the employment policy for which 
in the Amsterdam amendment to the EC Treaty "a co-ordinated strategy for 
employment" (Art. 125) was institutionalized. The genuine competence of the 
Member States in this very area remains uncontested. The Community is 
required to contribute to a high level of employment "by encouraging co-
operation between Member States and by supporting and, if necessary, 
complementing their action". 
To make sure that this aspiration has a chance to be realized, the Chapter on 
Employment provides for several institutional arrangements: There is the 
Employment Committee which is mainly supposed to monitor the situation on 
the labour market and the employment policies in the Member States and the 
Community and thereby help to prepare the relevant joint annual report by the 
Council and the Commission. In fulfilling its mandate, the Committee is 
required to consult the social partners. In order to make sure that the activities 
of the Employment Committee as well as the joint annual report by the Council 
and the Commission do not remain without consequences, the Chapter on 
Employment establishes additional powers for the Community. After 
examination of the joint annual report by the European Council and on the 
basis of the European Council's conclusions, the Council "shall each year draw 
up guidelines" (Art. 128 par. 2). The decision requires only a qualified 
majority. 
This arrangement has led to manifold measures and significantly increased 
the interrelated activities between the Member States. The summits of 
Luxemburg, Cologne and Lisbon are important steps on this road. 29 However, 
the results in detail are of less importance in the context to be discussed here. 
Important is the fact that the Chapter on Employment establishes a mutual 
learning process for the Community and the Member States, including not only 
governments but also the social partners. None of the Member States can 
escape the permanent dialogue and the permanent pressure implied by it. Best 
practices do not have to be reinvented all the time but can easily be. 
communicated and imitated. The awareness by the media is growing 
significantly. The whole structure to an increasing extent is understood as a 
joint European activity. The goal — in spite of the wording of the Treaty — is a 
gradual denationalization and Europeanization of employment policy. 
29  For a very reliable assessment of this development see J. GOETSCHY: European 
Employment Policy since the 1990s, in B. Keller / H.-W. Platzer (eds.), Industrial Relations and 
European Integration, Ashgate, Aldershot / Burlington, 2003, 137. 
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3.6. Employees ' Involvement in Management 's Decision Making 
The perhaps most important input by the European Community into the field of 
industrial relations took place in the area of employees' involvement in 
management's decision-making. 30 As in the area of collective bargaining also 
here the situation in the different Member States from the very beginning was 
characterized by extreme diversity. Some countries were not at all abiding to 
such a philosophy of cooperation at all but focusing exclusively on conflict and 
collective bargaining. In order to guarantee at least a minimum of employees' 
influence in management's decision making the European legislator already in 
the seventies of last century prescribed patterns of information and consultation 
in case of collective redundancies31 and in case of transfer of undertakings" and 
later on in the eighties on health and safety. 33 However, this was only a 
beginning. The program has become much more ambitious. In the meantime 
attempts were successful to establish patterns of employees' involvement on 
transnational scale and to uplift significantly the minimum level in the national 
context. 
The first step in this direction was the Directive on European Works 
Councils (EWCs) in 1994. 34 Instead of regulating everything in a substantial 
way it only provides for a procedural arrangement, establishing a special 
negotiating body representing the workers' interests and leaving more or less 
everything to negotiations between this body and the central management of a 
transnational undertaking or group of undertaking. It is up to the special 
negotiating body to decide with a two thirds majority not to request an 
agreement. Only if the central management refuses to commence negotiations 
within six months of receiving such a request or if after three years the two 
parties are unable to reach an agreement, the subsidiary requirements set out in 
the Annex to the Directive do apply. These subsidiary requirements are the only 
form of pressure available to the special negotiating body. Until the date of 
implementation into national law of the Member States the Directive allowed 
for voluntary agreements where even the minimal conditions of the Directive 
did not play a role. In the meantime a bit more than a third of the undertakings 
covered by the Directive have implemented it in actual practice. 35 Where 
30  For a description of the debates leading to this development see M. WEISS: Workers' 
Participation in the European Union, in: P. Davies et alii (eds.), European Community Labour 
Law — Principles and Perspectives, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1996, 213. 
31 (1975) Official Journal (OJ) L 48. 
32  (1977) OJ L 61. 
33  (1989) OJ L 183/1. 
34  (1994) OJ L 254/64. 
35  For recent assessments of the factual implementation of the Directive see S. DEMETRIADES: 
European Works Councils Directive: A Success Story ?, in M. Biagi (ed.), Quality of Work and 
Employee Involvement in Europe, Kluwer Law International, The Hague / London / New York, 
2002, 49 and T. MÜLLER / H.-W. PLATZER: European Works Councils: A New Mode of EU 
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subsidiaries of CEE States are involved, representatives of those candidate 
countries voluntarily have become included into the EWCs. This has turned out 
to be an excellent strategy to reduce reservations against employees' 
involvement in management's decision-making as they still exist in the CEE 
States." As empirical studies show the EWCs develop unpredictable dynamics 
of their own, achieving sometimes far-reaching agreements with the Central 
management: all depends on the interface with other factors of the overall 
industrial relations structure. 37 
The same pattern as in the EWC Directive is followed by the second step, 
the Directive of October 2001 on employees' involvement in the European 
Company. 38 The Directive has to be read together with the Statute on the 
European Company which contains the rules on company law. 
A European Company only can be registered if the requirements of the 
Directive are met. Thereby it is guaranteed that the provisions on workers' 
involvement cannot be ignored. The structure of the Directive is very much the 
same as in the Directive on European Works Councils: it provides for a special 
negotiating body, list up the topics for negotiation and leaves everything to 
negotiations. In case the negotiations fail, there is a fall back clause, the so 
called standard rules. The Directive contains two different topics which have to 
be distinguished carefully. The first refers to information and consultation. 
Here the structure is very similar to the one developed in the Directive on 
European Works Councils. The application of the Directive on European 
Works Councils is excluded in the European Company. 
The crucial and interesting topic of the Directive refers to employees' 
participation which is defined as "the influence of the body representative of 
the employees and/or employees' representatives in the affairs of a company by 
way of (1) the right to elect or appoint some of the members of the company's 
supervisory or administrative organ, or (2) the right to recommend and/or 
oppose the appointment of some or all members of the company's supervisory 
or administrative organ". Normally it is up to the negotiations how such a 
scheme has to look like. Only in case of transformation the agreement "has to 
provide at least the same level of all elements of employees' involvement as the 
ones existing within the company to be converted into a European Company". 
If in other cases a reduction of the participation level would be the result of the 
negotiations, qualified majority requirements apply which make sure that by 
way of agreement the existing highest level cannot be easily or carelessly 
reduced. If no agreement is reached the standard rules apply and make sure that 
Regulation and the Emergence of a European Multi-level Structure of Workplace Industrial 
Relations, in B. Keller / H.-W. Platzer (eds.), Industrial Relations and European Integration, 
Ashgate, Aldershot / Burlington, 2003, 58. 
J6 For this effect see M. SEWERYNSKI: (FN 13) 272. 
37  See T. MÜLLER / H.-W. PLATZER: (FN 35) 80. 
38  (2001) OJ L 294/22. 
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in cases where to a significant extent a scheme of workers' participation 
already existed prior to the engagement into a European company the level of 
this scheme is maintained. However, no participation scheme is needed if none 
of the participating companies has been "governed by participation rules prior 
to the registration of the European Company. " 39 
Also the third and perhaps most important step, the Directive of March 2002 
on the minimum framework for information and consultation on national 
level, 40 is shaped according to the same philosophy. It sets some minimum 
conditions and leaves everything else to the Member States. The Directive 
applies to establishments of at least 20 employees and to undertakings of at 
least 50 employees. In the original version of the proposal reference was only 
made to undertakings. 
The purpose of the Directive is "to establish a general framework setting out 
minimum requirements for the right to information and consultation of 
employees in undertakings or establishments within the Community". The 
Directive defines the structure of information and consultation in a much more 
comprehensive way than this is done so far in other Directives. The definitions 
contain important procedural requirements. Timing, content and manner of 
information have to be such that it corresponds to the purpose and allows the 
employees' representatives to examine the information and to prepare for 
consultation. Consultation has to meet several requirements: (1) it has to be 
ensured that the timing, the method and the content are effective; (2) 
information and consultation have to take place at the appropriate level of 
management and representation, depending on the subject under discussion; (3) 
the employees' representatives are entitled to formulate an opinion on the basis 
of the relevant information to be supplied by the employer; (4) the employees' 
representatives are entitled to meet with the employer and to obtain a response, 
and the reasons for that response, to any opinion they may formulate; and 
finally (5) in case of decisions within the scope of the employer's management 
powers an attempt has to be made to seek prior agreement on the decisions 
covered by information and consultation. Unfortunately the Directive does not 
tell what is happening if an agreement is reached, but the employer is not 
implementing it. 
Information has to cover the recent and probable development of the 
undertaking's or the establishment's activities and economic situation in its 
broadest sense. Information and consultation has to take place on the structure 
and probable development of employment within the undertaking or 
establishment and on any anticipatory measures envisaged in particular where 
39  For a first evaluation of the Directive see M. WEISS: Workers' Involvement in the European 
Company, in M. Biagi (ed.), Quality of Work and Employee Involvement in Europe, Kluwer Law 
International, 2002, 63. 
40 (2002) OJ L 80/29. 
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there is a threat of unemployment. Finally information and consultation has to 
take place on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work 
organisation or in contractual relations, including those covered by the 
Community provisions. 
On the whole the Directive remains very flexible and leaves the structural 
framework and the modalities to a great extent to the Member States. 
Nevertheless it turned out that the opposition of some countries only could be 
overcome by granting transitional provisions. They are supposed to apply if at 
the date of the entry into force of the Directive in the respective Member State 
(March 2005) there is "no general, permanent and statutory system of 
information and consultation of employees. nor a general, permanent and 
statutory system of employee representation at the workplace allowing 
employees to be represented for that purpose". In these countries the first two 
years after implementation into national law employees the Directive only 
applies to companies employing at least 150 or establishments employing at 
least 100 employees. In the third year this is lowered to 100 and 50. And 
afterwards the Directive applies as everywhere else. In short: those who do not 
know a system of institutionalized system of employees' information and 
consultation are not exposed to a shock-therapy but get the chance of a smooth 
transition. 
Their mere existence of these Directives does not leave any doubt that the 
promotion of employees' involvement in company's decision-making has 
become an essential part of the Community's mainstreaming strategy in its 
social policy agenda. It has transgressed definitely the "point of no return". 
This policy is in line with the already mentioned Art. 27 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, guaranteeing the workers' right of information 
and consultation. This has an important implication: countries with a tradition 
of exclusively adversarial structures have no longer a choice but to restructure 
their systems towards a concept of partnership and cooperation. 
All these Directives have their weaknesses: they are unnecessarily 
complicated, not always consistent and above all very vague in their 
terminology. The Directive supplementing the Statute of the European 
Company as well as the Directive on a national framework for information and 
consultation have been watered down during the legislative process: the result 
is the lowest denominator. However, in assessing the importance of these 
measures for the future of industrial relations in the EU these deficiencies 
should not be overstated. The decisive element is the fact that these 
instruments, taken as a whole, force all actors involved — trade unions and 
workers' representatives, employers' associations, employers and employees — 
to discuss and reflect on the potential of employees' information and 
consultation and in the case of the Directive supplementing the Statute on the 
European Company even on workers' participation in company boards. Finally 
it has to be stressed that the Community's approach does not focus on 
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introducing specific institutional patterns but simply stimulates and initiates 
procedures for the promotion of the idea of employees' involvement in 
management's decision-making. 
4. Integration of Industrial Relations in an Enlarged EU 
4.1. The Insufficiency of the mere Transposition of the Acquis Communautaire 
The CEE States as well as all other candidate countries were required to 
transpose all EC legislation (the so called acquis communitaire) in their 
respective legal systems. In view of the huge amount of such legislation this 
was a difficult task to be performed in a relatively short time. In general the 
candidate countries — including the CEE States — had no problems to meet this 
precondition for accession. With the help of external experts (the so called 
process of "screening") they succeeded to an admirable extent in transposing 
the EU law into their respective legal structure. 41 However, the gap between the 
law in the books and the law in action as indicated above also plays a role in 
this context. The focus remains on the normative level. As long as the 
institutions and actors guaranteeing a satisfying implementation in actual 
practice are not available it would be illusionary to assume that mere 
transposition of EU law does have an effective impact into the reality of the 
CEE States. 42 It might well remain to be mere window-dressing. 
As indicated above quite a few of the Directives (as for example those on 
working time or on health and safety, two areas where the CEE States are still 
are lagging far behind the present EU average 43) need the involvement of social 
partners and/or workers' representatives in order to be adequately implemented. 
This of course is not possible as long as the respective actors and instruments 
are still absent. 44 
4.2. Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining 
In order to be able to participate in the cross-sectoral as well as in the 
sectoral social dialogues on European level it needs respective structures in the 
national context. The same is true for the strategy of coordinated collective 
bargaining as described above. Here the deficits in the CEE States are 
significant. In particular social dialogue and collective bargaining at sectoral 
41 See S. CLAUWAERT / W. DÜvEL: The implementation of the social acquis communautaire in 
Central and Estern Europe, ETUI Interim Report, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels, 
2000. 
42 M. LADÓ/ D. VAUGHAN-WHITEHEAD: (FN 6) 80. 
43  Ibidem. 
44  Ibidem. 
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level are to be developed. If these intermediary structures are missing there will 
be neither an input to the European social dialogue from the CEE States nor 
will they be able to adequately cope with the input provided by the social 
dialogue. Neither framework agreements concluded in the context of the 
European cross-sectoral social dialogue (like the one on tele-work) nor similar 
agreements or guidelines developed in the context of European sectoral social 
dialogues will have any relevance for the CEE States as long as there are no 
intermediary structures in place. And of course as long as trade unions and 
employers' associations do not have an appropriate organisational structure, 
they will not be able to play their respective roles in the mutual learning 
process at it was sketched above by taking the example of employment policy. 
It cannot be denied that social partners and industrial relations in the CEE 
States are in danger to remain disconnected from the patterns established on 
European level." 5  Then the highly praised open method of coordination could 
not work at all. The fight against this very danger is a challenge not only for the 
trade unions but also and in particular for the employers' associations. And it is 
of course also a challenge of the social partners of the present Member States 
and the present EU to support this development, as it was promised at the 
summit in Laeken when Belgium the last time had the Presidency of the EU. 
4.3. Employees' Involvement in Management's Decision Making 
As shown above employees' involvement in management's decision-making 
not only has become one of the core activities in the mainstream of the EC 
social policy. It furthermore has reached a point where Member States no 
longer can escape. The latest with the recent Directive on a framework of 
information and consultation the question no longer is whether the Member 
States may have such an institutional arrangement, the question merely is how 
they shape it. But even in this respect the leeway is narrowed down: all the 
topics mentioned by the Directive are to be covered and the requirements for 
adequate information and consultation schemes are to be met. There is no doubt 
that the arrangements established so far in the CEE States do not live up yet to 
these standards. It of course is up to the CEE States whether they prefer a 
system exclusively based on trade union representation or a dual system with 
special elected bodies in addition to the existing trade unions. It is also up to 
the CEE States whether they establish different structures for enterprises where 
trade unions are present and where they are absent. In so far the Directive does 
not prescribe anything since it refers to workers' representatives according to 
national law and practice. However, it has to be stressed that the Directive only 
is adequately implemented if workers' representatives in the establishments and 
undertakings covered by the Directive are available. It should be added that this 
45 This view is shared by M. LADE / D. VAUGHAN-WHITEHEAD: (FN 6) 83. 
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implementation problem is not only one for the CEE States but also for quite a 
few old Member States of the present EU. In so far there will be a unique 
opportunity to learn from each other by intensive exchange of information. 
However, the problem for the CEE States is not only confined to the 
question of how to shape the pattern of information and consultation but to 
develop a consistent and coherent multi-level system of industrial relations-4'n' 
which employees' involvement in management's decision making has its proper 
place. It is of utmost importance to organise a rather clear-cut division of labour 
between the system of information and consultation in management's decision-
making and collective bargaining. If there are too many overlaps the industrial 
relations machinery will not be able to function properly and it will not gain the 
acceptance by the trade unions. It is important to develop the respective 
systems in cooperation with the trade unions. Whether they already are in a 
position to fulfil this role, however, may well be doubted. 
S. Conclusion 
The CEE States are still in the stage of transformation as far as industrial 
relations are concerned. Systems of employees' involvement in management's 
decision-making are rather the exception than the rule. And where they exist 
they are weak. There is not yet a consistent multi-level system of industrial 
relations. Collective bargaining still is a rudimentary phenomenon, mainly 
taking place on company level. Intermediary levels of collective bargaining and 
social dialogue are missing. The private sector to a great extent is lacking 
collective representation whatsoever. 
In this situation the accession to the EU means a particular challenge for 
both: for the EU in their attempt to built up an integrated system of industrial 
relations and for the CEE States in their aspiration not to be disconnected from 
this EU pattern. Thereby, EU enlargement could play the role of a catalyst in 
this process. As shown above, there is a likelihood that it will accelerate and 
shape to a certain extent the dynamics of transformation. And this of course 
again will have an impact on the future structure of the EU arrangements. There 
is not a one way perspective but reciprocity. The optimistic view would be that 
thereby a mutual learning process is established for the benefit of both: the EU 
as well as the CEE States. 
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MANFRED WEISS 
AZ EU BŐVÍTÉSÉNEK HATÁSA A MUNKAÜGYI 
KAPCSOLATOKRA 
(Összefoglalás) 
Az Európai Unió számára nagy kihívást jelent a keleti bővítés. Többek közö tt 
felmerül, hogy a munkaügyi kapcsolatok rendszerének európaivá válását 
mennyiben fogja a bővítés érinteni. A tanulmány arra a kérdésre keresi a 
választ, hogy a közép-kelet európai csatlakozó államok felkészülve kapcsolód-
nak-e be ezekbe a folyamatokba. Megállapítja, hogy jelentős hiányok figyel-
hetők meg ezen a területen, amelyeket közös erőfeszítéssel kell felszámolni. 
